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Abstract 
 
One of a firm’s major financial decisions that lies in the hands of the board of directors is dividend policy which has 
long been linked to the firm’s profitability and performance. From the shareholders’ viewpoint, profitability does 
not necessarily add value to their wealth unless and until it translates into dividend payment and price 
appreciation.Therefore, how corporate governance via board structure influences the use of free cash flow and how  
this interaction affects dividend payment are crucial. This study examined the interaction effects of firm’s 
characteristics such as board structure and free cash flow on divided per share as a proxy of firm’s performance.  
The fixed effect regression with a sample of 361 non-financial Malaysian listed firms over the period of 2002 to 
2007 were employed in the analysis. The interaction between board structure, independent directors ,  board size and 
free cash flow revealed that duality weakens the positive effect of free cash flow on dividend, while independent 
directors strengthen the positive effect of free cash flow on dividend payment. Overall, the results of this study may 
be surmised to suggest that large number of independent directors in the board of directors benefits the firms in the 
use of free cash flow, leading to an increase in distributable income to shareholders; but the existence of duality role 
does not benefit firms in the use of free cash flow, leading to a decrease in distributable income to shareholders. 
However, board size does not have an effect on the use of free cash flow and performance.  
 
Keywords: board structure, dividend policy, free cash flow, Malaysian listed firms, performance, profitability  
 
 
Introduction 
 
One of firm’s major financial decisions that lies in the hands of the board of directors is dividend policy 
which has long been linked to firm’s profitability and performance. From the shareholders’ viewpoint, 
profitability does not necessarily add value to their wealth unless and until it translates into dividend 
payment and price appreciation.  Free cash flow available to entrenched managers is likely to lead to 
overinvestment or underinvestment. This study differs from (Holder et al., 1998; Hossain et al., 2001; 
Knyazeva, 2006 and Adjaoud & Ben Amar, 2010) and in that it extends to examine the interaction effect 
of different board structure and available free cash flow and how this interaction effect affects firm 
performance in terms of dividend payment.  Holder et al. (1998) examined how ownership structure in 
terms of insider affects dividend payment with the presence of free cash flow. Hossain et al. 2001, for 
example examined how external factor like a passage of legislation regulation interacts with outside 
directors to influence firm performance. This study also extends Adjaoud and Ben Amar’s (2010) 
corporate governance structure in terms of board composition by including board of directors’ size. 
Suraiya and Raflis (2015) emphasize that strong business entity is supported by strong organizational 
structure and effective method of financial distribution. 
Therefore, how corporate governance via board structure influences the use of free cash flow and how 
does this interaction affects dividend payment are crucial to be examined. This study then contributes to 
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the existing literature by examining the interaction effects of internal governance structure in terms of 
board structure and decision made by the board of directors through free cash flow on dividend payment 
by incorporating other crucial financial decisions including investment and operating cash flow over sales 
as measure of profitability. In brief, this study takes the relatively less attended perspective of 
shareholders’ returns by focusing on dividend streams as a measure of firm performance, instead of stock 
price appreciation. This study proposes that the increase in corporate performance in the terms of 
dividend per share is the result of firm’s adoption of best governance and capital structure practices. 
Using a sample of 361 non-financial Malaysian firms which were listed for 6 consecutive years on Bursa 
Malaysia from 2002 until 2007, this study constructs a balanced panel data consisting of 2166 yearly 
observations.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, related literature is reviewed and hypotheses are 
developed; Sections 3 presents the variables, sample and methodology; and Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. The paper concludes in Section 5 which also offers the implications and suggestions for 
future research. 
 
 
Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
a) Agency theory, free cash flow and dividend policy  
 
In the presence of high agency costs of free cash flow, the corporate board of directors (BOD) can play a 
greater role in influencing corporate performance through dividends. The BOD is entrusted with the 
power and authority to act on behalf of the shareholders to oversee and control the upper management’s 
actions and decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to agency theory, firms can minimize agency 
costs by establishing appropriate monitoring systems especially through their BOD which have the “top 
hands” to effectively supervise the managers (Fama & Jensen,1983; Bryd & Hickman, 1992; Sulong & 
Mat Nor, 2007). If the BOD decides to distribute cash in the form of dividends, it reduces the likelihood 
of managers to over invest, that is investing in negative net present value (NPV) project. Holder et al. 
(1998) and John and Knyazeva, (2006) found a positive association between free cash flow and dividend 
payouts. Wei and Zhang (2008) concluded that the positive relationship between cash flow and 
investment from agency cost’s perspective is basically a symptom of overinvestment; while from 
asymmetric information’s perspective it is basically a symptom of underinvestment. They further 
described that  overinvestment is due to managers’ tendency to overspend their free cash flow while 
underinvestment is due to firm’s tendency to forgo positive NPV projects because the cost of external 
capital is too expensive as compared to cost of internal capital. Wang (2010) examined how free cash 
flow relates to agency cost and how free cash flow and agency cost influences firm performance. He 
found that free cash flow could lead to agency cost but at the same time could lead to better performance.  
As described in literature, there are various recommendations and rules for governance reforms (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; The Cadbury Committee 1992). Others have shown that the effectiveness of 
BOD can be the result of having the right structure. Hossain, Prevost and Rao (2001) found direct effects 
of board composition and structure on firm performance. They also found an interaction effect between 
outside directors and changes in external environment like passage of law on firm performance in New 
Zealand. In relation to governance structure and dividend payment, Wood and Tashakori (1989) 
discovered that board composition affects dividend policy. Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) also found that 
board composition is positively related to payout ratio, and they concluded that firms with stronger 
corporate governance have higher dividend payouts.  
 
 
 
 
GEOGRAFIA Online
TM
 Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12 issue 2 (58 - 67) 60                                   
Themed issue on contemporary financial, business, investment and entrepreneurial facets of Malaysia’s development  
© 2016, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
b) Board governance 
 
This paper focuses on three aspects of board governance in light of board structure namely, board duality, 
BOD independence and BOD size. Empirical studies have found that increased outsiders on the board are 
likely to promote decisions that are in the interests of external shareholders (Brickley et al., 1997; Tosi et 
al., 1997; Weisbach, 1988). Evidently, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found that stock market reacts 
favorably to the appointment of additional outside directors. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006/2007), however, argued that board independence fails to create the expected impact on firm 
performance due to lack of training and unfamiliarity with the procedures. Specifically, we hypothesize 
that the greater the number of independent directors in the BOD, the better the performance of the 
company as there are more outside, independent directors to monitor effectively the actions of the 
executive directors. 
Another facet of board governance that has been associated to the BOD effectiveness is role duality 
which occurs when the same person undertakes the roles of both the board chairman and the company’s 
chief executive officer (CEO). There are empirical evidence in support of the views of both the 
proponents (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994); (Boyd 1995); and opponents (Dahya et al. 1996; Kyereboah-
Coleman & Biekpe 2006/2007); (Bozec & Dia, 2007) of role duality. Yet, there are also those (Baliga et 
al. 1996; Brickley et al. 1997; Dalton et al. 1998; Vafaes & Theodorou 1998) who found that role duality 
has no particular effect on performance. Proponents of role duality argue that having the same person for 
the top posts indicate greater understanding and knowledge of as well as commitment to the firm’s 
operating environment. The opponents on the other hands argue that giving too much power to one person 
is undesirable as it can create problem in monitoring and controlling the decision making process. In the 
context of Malaysian companies, we hypothesize that role duality has a negative effect on firm 
performance as this is more consistent with the recommendations of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance 2001 (MCCG 2001); i.e. to separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO. 
The last facet of board governance examined in this study is the board size, which refers to the number 
of directors serving in a firm’s BOD. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found 
positive effect of small board size while Canyon and Peck (1998) found negative effect of certain number 
of board size. In the context of this study, we hypothesize that small board size is positively related to 
firm performance.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
To examine the effects of board structure and free cash flow on dividend per share this study used the 
yearly data of companies that were consistently listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (formerly 
known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the period from 2002 to 20071. This period is observed to 
exclude the external shock due to subprime crisis that may start to affect the Malaysian firms and 
financial market in the following years. The structure of the panel, by number of annual observation over 
the 6 years period per company for a total of 361 sample firms, provides a total of 2166 yearly firm 
observations on a balanced panel data basis. Effect of market timing which promotes higher equity and 
thus, lower debt during good market condition (Elliot, Koëter-Kant and Warr 2008) seems to be a 
negligible issue in this study as it covers period of tranquility after the market is relatively free from the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.  
The three measures of board governance which emphasize on the importance of certain characteristics 
of the BOD structure in influencing effectiveness of firms’ decision making, are measured as follows; 
                                                 
1
 Data in 2001 were used to estimate changes in total assets in the calculations of investment variable in 2002. 
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1. Duality roles in BOD (BDUA) is a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 if the CEO is 
also the Chairman of the BOD and zero otherwise,  
2. Level of independence in the BOD (BIND) is the total number of independent (outside) non-
executive directors, and  
3. Size of BOD (BSIZ) is the natural log of the total number of directors in the BOD.  
 
To examine the role of BOD in determining performance, this study focuses on the component of firm 
performance which is directly under the control of the directors, i.e., dividend payment. While most 
studies concentrated on market value or stock price changes to gauge the performance of the firms, such 
measurement has weaknesses particularly because stock price does not always reflect the fundamental 
values of the companies. More often than not, it is influenced by macroeconomic factors than firm-
specific factors. In short, this study proposed that it is more appropriate to judge BOD based on its 
effectiveness in creating wealth for the firm’s shareholders through the effect of decision that it has a 
direct control on. Dividend payment is examined on the per share basis: 
 
Dividend policy: 
ti,
ti,
ti, gOutstandin Shares
Dividend
DPS       (1) 
 
Dividend per share (DPS) is also more relevant as a measure of firm performance in this study than 
market performance due to its effect or relationship with the firm’s free cash flow. Following previous 
studies (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Wei & Zhang, 2008), this study used debt ratio to measure leverage; 
 
Leverage: 
ti
ti
ti Assets TotalBV
Debt TotalBV
LEV
,
,
, )(
)(       (2) 
 
As indicated by the preliminary results of this study, there is a tendency for management decision to 
incline towards maintaining a constant dividend payment per share (DPS) instead of purely distributing 
dividends based on the availability of positive earnings for common shareholders (net income available to 
common shareholders or NIACS). Maintaining DPS demonstrates the firm’s ability to distribute some 
profits to their shareholders. However, this ability might be influenced by capital structure because 
increases in debt increase interest expenses; which in turn, will reduce the net income distributable to the 
shareholders. Since common shareholders are at the bottom of the priority claimants of firms’ income and 
assets, increases in interest expenses subsequently reduce the DPS unless the debt is raised for 
recapitalization strategy to retire common stocks. Furthermore, if the signaling hypothesis that debt 
issuance reflects a firm’s future prospect is supported, increase in debt for the financing of firms’ positive 
net present value project could actually increases profitability; and consequently increases or at least 
maintains DPS.   
The impacts of two major financial variables which in the literature are widely accepted as having 
large impact on performance, specifically in terms of dividend payment, were considered. The first is 
investment which has a direct negative impact on the availability of cash flows for dividend payment. 
Since external financing is both costly and takes a longer time to raise, internal capital (retained earnings) 
is readily available fund in which BOD and management are more likely to favor in financing firms’ 
projects. The greater the fraction of retained earnings allocated for investment, the less there is for 
distribution to common shareholders. Thus, this study hypothesizes that investment is negatively 
associated with dividend payment. Investment for the ith company at year t is defined as follows; 
 
Investment: 



1,
,
,
 
 
ln
ti
ti
ti AssetsTotal
AssetsTotal
INV       (3) 
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The second financial variable is free cash flow, basically because dividend payment is expected to be the 
result of how firms use free cash flow on available project to generate profit.  
 
Free-Cash-Flows: 
ti
ti
ti Asset TotalBV
DivTaxIntDepEBIT
FCF
,
,
, )(
)( 
   (4) 
 
The agency theory, specifically free cash flow hypothesis, has been used to describe management’s 
decision to return cash to shareholders. It is argued that when given a large amount of cash, managers 
could over invest in negative net present values projects to the detriment of their shareholders 
(Easterbrook, 1984); Jensen, 1986). Based on the argument that BOD is responsible in making decision 
about dividend payment and uses of free cash flow, this study attempted to examine the interaction effect 
of BOD structure and free cash flow on dividend policy. This study used fixed effect panel regression 
model by taking the lagged values of each variable in the following representation: 
 
1,9
1,81,71,61,1,,
)(
)()()(...)(



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ti
titititititi
FCFxBSIZE
FCFxBINDFCFxBDUABSIZINVDPS


 
 
where  is the regression intercepts, 1 to 9 are the coefficient estimates of respective independent 
variables which definitions are as represented in Eq. (1) to Eq.(4) and in corporate governance variable 
descriptions where  FCF x B… are  the interactions between debt ratio and each dimension of BOD 
structure, while the remaining variables are defined as in Eq.(1) to  Eq.(4). The results of the Hausman 
test which suggests the use of fixed as opposed to random effect is more appropriate for the data of this 
study are reported in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Results of the Hausman Test  
 
Test Summary Chi-sq Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 21.127509 9 0.0121 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The correlation matrix for the variables is shown in Table 2. The financial profiles of the sample firms as 
far as variables used in this study are concerned are reported in Table 3. The mean dividend per share 
(DPS) is RM0.0612 with the highest value can go up to RM2.572 per share. Among the top dividend 
payers are Edaran Otomobil Nasional, Melewar Industrial Group, and Nestle (Malaysia) Ltd. but none is 
as consistent in paying a handsome dividend as British American Tobacco (M) Ltd. Still, these amounts 
might be somewhat trivial compared to the average annual return of 15.36 percent from the price 
appreciation in the common stocks of the sample companies. With regard to the BOD structure, only 
about 28 percent of the companies are relying on the same person to assume the responsibilities of the 
CEO and Chairperson of the company. This is in line with the MCCG2001 recommendation of separating 
the two roles. The average BOD consists 8 directors, 3 of whom are independent outside directors, also 
suggesting compliance to the MCCG2001 recommendation of 1/3 independent BOD composition. 
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Table 2. Correlations between variables (2002 to 2007) 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
INV 1.00 
      TD/TA -0.05 1.00 
     DPS -0.03 -0.08 1.00 
    FCF 0.25 -0.19 0.05 
    BDUA 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.03 1.00 
  BIND 0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.07 -0.10 1.00 
 BSIZ 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.11 -0.15 0.48 1.00 
Note: Column headings correspond to row headings. Variables are defined on page 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Table 3. Financial characteristics of the sample firms, 2002 – 2007 
 
Notes: In the regression equation, board size is transformed into the natural log and the respective values are mean = 
2.0101, std. deviation = 0.3079, minimum = 0.6990 and maximum = 2.9957. 
 
The level of leverage indicates that Malaysian firms are of relatively lesser leveraged than those of 
other countries. For instance, Table 2 reports mean debt ratio of 23 percent. This could be attributed to the 
bond market in this market which is considered rather small and accessible only to large and stable 
companies; as such firms still have to rely on the banking systems for borrowings. The free cash flows 
(over total assets) are as low as 1.64 percent, up to 4.21 percent (highest value reported in 2003). 
Evidently, investment only reported a 5 percent growth rate on yearly basis.    
The results of the fixed effect regressions of board governance on dividend per share, while 
controlling for the other variables are reported in Table 3. Specifically, the interaction between duality 
and free cash flow is significantly negative; therefore, weaken the insignificant positive effect of free cash 
flow on dividend per share. Meanwhile, the interaction between independent directors and free cash flow 
is significantly positive; therefore, strengthen the insignificant positive effect of free cash flow on 
dividend per share. These findings indicate that DPS increases in cases where the BOD is characterized 
with large number of independent directors in the board of directors to decide on free cash flow but 
decreases in cases where chief executive officer cum chairman to decide on free cash flow. However, the 
interaction between board size and free cash flow is not significant. These findings are consistent with 
Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori (1989) and Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) who discovered that board 
composition affects dividend policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Role Duality (BDUA) 0.2770 0.4476 0.0000 1.0000 
Independence (BIND) 2.9640 0.9939 0.0000 8.0000 
Board Size (BSIZ) 7.7993 2.2304 2.0117 20.000 
Dividend per Share (DPS) 0.0612 0.1680 0.0000 2.5720 
Investment (INV) 0.0500 0.3127 -3.9267 3.7188 
Leverage (TD/TA) 0.2302 0.2096 0.0000 2.9163 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 0.0308 0.1346 
 
1.64 4.21 
GEOGRAFIA Online
TM
 Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12 issue 2 (58 - 67) 64                                   
Themed issue on contemporary financial, business, investment and entrepreneurial facets of Malaysia’s development  
© 2016, ISSN 2180-2491 
 
Table 4. Results of Panel Regressions 
 
Notes: *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 
10% level. 
 
Capital structure (leverage) is also highly significant in influencing dividend payment in manner 
consistent with the prediction. When firms must commit a larger fraction of their earnings to service 
higher debts, lesser income would be available for dividend payment to the common shareholders. Not to 
ignore the fact that dividends to common stockholders can only be paid unless there are residual from 
earnings after interest and preferred dividend payment are settled. Capital structure is indeed the only 
financial variable that plays a significant role in determining dividend. Both investment and free cash 
flow do not have significant effects on dividend per share.  
Meanwhile, adding the interactions between board structure and free cash flow into the estimation 
model reveal two interesting findings. First, there are two interaction effects between BOD role duality 
and free cash flow, and between BOD independence and free cash flow in influencing dividend payment. 
To begin with, FCFxBDUA and FCFxBIND are highly significant; suggesting that in companies that use 
free cash flow, duality can decrease the dividend payment while independent directors can increase 
dividend payment. Duality and free cash flow co-exist probably because they maximize the conflict of 
interest in CEO/Chairperson’s decision on free cash flow available that results in negative project return. 
Additionally, so does the effect of interaction between BOD independent directors’ composition and free 
cash flow which enhances the positive effect of dividend payment. However, the BOD size is no longer 
necessarily relevant in influencing dividend payment in the presence of free cash flow. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
On the argument that board of directors is responsible for the free cash flow available and dividend per 
share, the opposite effects but significant as shown by the interaction between board structure (duality and 
number of independent directors); and free cash flow confirms that board structure has influence on the 
decision of free cash flow made by the firm. These findings imply that having the same person as 
Chairman and CEO or duality increases the agency cost with the presence of free cash flow, although 
duality allows a person to have greater understanding and knowledge of firm (Simpson and Gleason 
(1999).  Meanwhile, having a large number of independent directors do benefit the firms in deciding the 
use of free cash flow that results to higher dividend payment. These findings support our hypotheses that 
 
Independent Variables 
Interaction Model 
Coefficient t-stats 
Intercept  -0.000355 -0.435344 
  Role Duality (BDUA) -0.003718 -2.642219*** 
  Board Size (BSIZ) -0.018074 -8.445039*** 
Independence (BIND) 0.009912 6.508111*** 
Leverage (TD/TA) -0.022458 -7.397752*** 
Investment (INV) 0.000159 0.110333 
Free cash flow(FCF) 0.000319 0.158124 
(FCF*BDUA)
-1 -0.007891 -3.634941*** 
(FCF*BSIZ)
-1 -0.002907 -1.488114 
(FCF*BIND)
-1 0.006324 3.226512*** 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.957521  
F-Statistics 133.2516  
Durbin-Watson 1.569179  
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duality has negative effect on performance while independent directors has positive effect on 
performance. Meanwhile, having larger number of independent directors do benefit the firms to decide on 
free cash flow that leads to higher dividend payment. This finding may not support Coles et al. (2001) 
that as they lack the knowledge about the firm, they rely on top executives for information to deliver their 
roles. This study therefore, contributes at highlighting internal factor role in terms of governance structure 
from agency cost’s perspective of free cash flow and its effects on firm performance.    
The limitation of study could be due to sample bias as firms with no complete detail of all the 
corporate variables of interest were not included in the analysis. The period between 2002 and 2007 used 
in this study does not include external shock due to financial crisis in 1997 and 2008, in which caution 
should be exercised in generalizing the results in different economic settings. Future research is 
recommended to examine the issue under the condition where the independent directors are the majority 
and the Chairman of the Board is a non executive director, as recommended in the revised MCCG in 
2012. 
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